

SECUR  
N.B. Th  
UPGRA

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

Contents checked  
for transfer to  
D.R.O.

(Sgd.) *NP*

Date *22/11/76.*

CONFIDENTIAL

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.  
or POST

FILE No. *R 25/548/1* (Part *B*)

TITLE: RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS  
BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ.

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

*Registry*  
*GSB*

*de*

*10/4*

*26/4*

*R*

*1/5*

*GSB*

*111-114*

*1/5*

*R*

*8/5*

*GSB*

*117*

*10/5*

*R*

*13/5*

*GSB*

*118*

*22/5*

*Reg*

*GSB*

*118-120*

*Reg*

*3/6*

*GSB*

*122*

*7/6*

*R*

*8/8*

*GSB*

*123*

*6/9*

*R*

*10/9*

*PKW*

*128*

*14/9*

*R*

*20/9*

*GSB*

*128*

*23/9*

*R*

*FCO 8/2329*

*W418*

Registry Address

Room No. *W. 92*

Downing Street (W)  
*3/10/04*

SE  
N.I  
UP  
HI

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

YEAR STAMP

*1074*

YEAR  
STAMP

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY  
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

PART *B*

FILE No. *R 25/548/1*



GRS 150

CONFIDENTIAL

83

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 081355Z APR.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081430Z APR.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 -9 APR 1974 NBR 25/28/1
---

25/26/4  
pa

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 117 OF 8 APRIL 1974.

YOUR TEL NO 062 : COMMUNIQUE.

1. TAQA DID ASK ME WHEN THEY PRODUCED THE FIRST DRAFT WHETHER THIS WAS A CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF SIR D. MAITLAND. I REPLIED THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE HOLDING A RANK EQUIVALENT TO UNDER - SECRETARY AND SINCE HE WAS RETURNING TO LONDON FROM NEW YORK IT SEEMED REASONABLE IF NOT WHOLLY CORRECT.

2. THE IRAQIS ARE LIKELY TO WISH TO DESCRIBE HIM AS AN UNDER-SECRETARY HERE. I SHALL SEE TAQA AT 16.00Z (7 P.M. ) TODAY AND CONVEY TEXT OF YOUR TEL 062. IF THEY ARE UNHAPPY I SHALL SUGGEST THAT SINCE SIR D. MAITLANDS NEW APPOINTMENT IS NOT YET KNOWN IT COULD CAUSE SPECULATION IN LONDON TO SO DESCRIBE HIM AND LEAVE IT FOR SIR DONALD TO EXPLAIN FURTHER ON ARRIVAL.

MCCLUNEY

FILES  
MED  
PCD  
NEWS  
POD  
GIPD  
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 210

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 081800Z APR.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 -9 APR 1974 NBR 25/248/11
---

TOP COPY  
25/248/11  
25/248/11

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 118 OF 08 APRIL 1974.

MY TEL NO 117 : COMMUNIQUE.

1. I APOLOGISED AND DISCUSSED REVISION WITH MISS BAKR WHO CONSULTED TAQA BETWEEN MEETINGS. THEY ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THE NEW TEXT. TAQA IS AN UNDER-SECRETARY AND RECEIVES UNDER-SECRETARYS. A CHANGE IN SIR D. MAITLANDS STATUS WILL HAVE TO BE REFERRED UPWARDS AT A TIME WHEN HIGHER AUTHORITIES ARE EXTREMELY BUSY.
2. I SAID SIR D. MAITLAND HAD NOT BEEN APPOINTED AN UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE F.C.O. HIS NEXT POST WAS UNKNOWN. IF HE WERE SO APPOINTED HE WOULD HOLD UNDER-SECRETARY RANK.
3. IN A SEARCH FOR A TITLE TAQA PROPOSED ''.....HEADED BY SIR DONALD MAITLAND, SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT VISITED.....''.
4. THEY MAY NOW PROPOSE CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS E.G. CUT ''IN VIEW OF THE COMMON DESIRE.....ETC'' TO ''WITH THE OBJECT OF RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND BRITAIN AND IN ORDER TO.....ETC''. THIS WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED ON ARRIVAL.

MCCLUNEY  
FILES  
MED  
P&CD  
NEWS DEPT  
POD  
GIPD  
MR WEIR


CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1



8 April, 1974

Mr. Williams  
J 9/4  
per.

You may like to know that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recently approved that Sir Donald Maitland should lead a delegation to Baghdad with the purpose of re-establishing diplomatic relations between the UK and Iraq.

This is in response to Iraqi soundings and clear indications from their side that they wish to re-establish relations. Sir Donald Maitland is leaving on 9 April.

All the indications are that agreement will be reached and I enclose the text of a communique produced by the Iraqis which may issue on 10 or 11 April. We have one or two minor amendments to suggest to the communique but otherwise agree with it.

(A. A. Acland)

The Lord Bridges,  
10 Downing Street,  
S.W.1.

78

TEL 1347/4  
FROM BAGHDAD.



PRIORITY  
CYPRER CAT A  
GRPS 70  
FM FCO 081705Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY N 35  
-9 APR 1974  
NBR 25/58/1

86

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM TELNO 26 OF 8 APRIL INFO BAHRAIN ABU DHABI  
DUBAI DOHA MUSCAT JEDDA KUWAIT WASHINGTON TEHRAN PARIS BONN  
BAGHDAD CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN

MY TELEGRAM NO 60 TO BAHRAIN (NOT TO ALL): UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. SUBJECT TO THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BAGHDAD BETWEEN  
THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AND THE DELEGATION HEADED BY SIR DONALD  
MAITLAND, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC  
RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL BE ISSUED  
SIMULTANEOUSLY IN BAGHDAD AND LONDON AT 1500 GMT ON 10 APRIL.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

M E D

N E N A D

P C D

NEWS DEPT

W E D

NORTH AMER DEPT

G I P D

P O D

RESEARCH DEPT (M E SECTION)

MR WEIR

MR CAMPBELL

MR WIGGIN

MR CARTER

MR HANKEY

MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 110

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 091050Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 - 9 APR 1974 NBR 25/28/1
--

(NB)

TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 65 OF 9 APRIL 1974.

YOUR TEL NO 118: COMMUNIQUE

1. PLEASE DISCUSS THE CHANGES SUGGESTED BY TAQA WITH SIR DONALD MAITLAND ON ARRIVAL. HE IS ALREADY AWARE OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

2. 'ENVOY' IS NOT ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT IS TOO CLOSE TO FORMAL DIPLOMATIC USAGE. IT ALSO RAISES THE QUESTION OF POWERS, THOUGH YOU SHOULD AVOID MENTIONING THIS TO THE IRAQIS. WE SUGGEST THEREFORE 'SPECIAL EMISSARY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.' YOU COULD PRECEDE THIS WITH: 'LATELY BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND...' 'SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE' WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE.

3. WE SEE NO NEED FOR ANY 'CONSEQUENTIAL' AMENDMENTS BUT WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THIS IS WHAT THE IRAQIS WANT.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

ME D

PCD

NEWS D

POD

GIPD

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

MR WILFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

87

25/28/14  
pm




IMMEDIATE  
CYPNER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 091210Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 091400Z



TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 66 OF 9 APRIL, 1974.

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY  
THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON  
8 APRIL CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING:

"MR PRESIDENT,  
IT IS A PARTICULAR PLEASURE TOO, AND AN HONOUR FOR ME AS WELL,  
THAT YOU ARE PRESIDING OVER THIS THE FIRST MEETING OF THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL THAT I HAVE ATTENDED. I DO NOT THINK THAT I  
WILL BE REVEALING ANY GREAT DIPLOMATIC SECRETS IF I SAY THAT I AM  
NOW HOPEFUL THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES  
WILL SHORTLY BE RESTORED AFTER A BREAK WHICH I BELIEVE BOTH  
OUR COUNTRIES HAVE COME TO REGRET. WE RECALL, MR PRESIDENT,  
WITH PLEASURE THE PERIOD WHEN YOU WERE YOUR COUNTRY'S AMBASSADOR  
IN LONDON, AND I CONGRATULATE YOU AND ASSURE YOU OF MY DELEGATION'S  
FULL CO-OPERATION."

CALLAGHAN

FILES:

MEL

UND

GIPD

NEWS D

MR. CAMPBELL

MR. WEIR

MR. WILFORD

CONFIDENTIAL



GR 200

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

89

FM BAGHDAD 092130Z

CONFIDENTIAL

87

/SIC/

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 105/ OF 9 APRIL. 1974.

YR TEL 65. COMMUNIQUE.

FOLLOWING FROM MAITLAND.



26/4  
HBB fa

1. I HAVE DISCUSSED TERMINOLOGY WITH TAQA.  
HIS PROBLEM IS THAT RCC AGREED TO RECEIVE ME ON UNDERSTANDING  
THAT I WAS HIS EQUIVALENT IN RANK, HENCE HIS ORIGINAL  
PROPOSAL OF QUOTE UNDER SECRETARY UNQUOTE. I HAVE PUT THE  
ALTERNATIVES TO HIM BUT HE IS CONVINCED THAT ONLY TERM LIKELY  
TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO RCC, WHO ARE ANYWAY MUCH OCCUPIED WITH  
VISIT OF BULGARIAN PRESIDENT, IS QUOTE SPECIAL ENVOY UNQUOTE  
AND HE STRESSED THE WORD QUOTE SPECIAL UNQUOTE.

2. TAQA HAS EMPHASISED THAT WHAT MATTERS ABOVE ALL TO IRAQI  
GOVERNMENT IS RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TOMORROW.  
HE DOES NOT WANT ANY HITCH. THIS IS OUR INTEREST TOO.  
IN MY JUDGEMENT TAQA'S EXPLANATION IS GENUINE AND THE  
IRAQIS DO NOT INTEND TO MAKE CAPITAL OUT OF TERM QUOTE SPECIAL  
ENVOY UNQUOTE C.F. FIRST TWO SENTENCES OF PARA 2 OF T.U.R.  
I PROPOSE THEREFORE TO ACCEPT THIS WORDING TOMORROW MORNING.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED

P & CD

NEWS D

POD

GIPD

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

MR WILFORD

CONFIDENTIAL




GR 40

RESTRICTED

90

CYPHER CAT A

FM BEIRUT 091030Z



TOP COPY

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 157 OF 9 APRIL: 1974 INFO  
STOCKHOLM, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, TEHRAN, PARIS, BONN, BAGHDAD,  
CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV: SAVING TO ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN,  
DUBAI, DOHA, MUSCAT AND JEDDA.

YOUR TELNO 60 TO BAHRAIN:

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. WE PASSED THE INFORMATION IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 2 TO THE MFA.  
THEY WERE GRATEFUL.

WRIGHT.

FILES  
MED  
NENAD  
PCD  
NEWS DEPT  
WED  
N AMERICAN DEPT  
GIPD  
POD  
RESEARCH DEPT (W.E. SECTION)  
MR WEIR  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WIGGIN  
MR CARTER  
MR HANKEY


RESTRICTED





**British Embassy**  
Tehran

CONFIDENTIAL



91

P K Williams Esq  
MED  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference  
3/16  
Date

4 April 1974

Dear Peter,

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

- 54
1. Dick Ellingworth called on Sadrieh, MFA Director General for Asia and Africa, on 1 April to brief him on the prospect of further contacts between the Iraqi Government and HMG (FCO telegram number 153 to Paris and related telegrams).
  2. Sadrieh took note of what Ellingworth said and was evidently not in the least surprised. He was grateful that we had let the Iranian Government know in advance and intimated that he would be telling the Shah.
  3. Sadrieh gave it as his personal view that the Iraqis were a bit lonely in the world and that they wished to diversify their foreign connexions; this wish would certainly embrace a desire for better relations with Britain.

Yours Sincerely

Nick

N W Browne

cc: Chanceries: Washington  
Kuwait

li Bowyer 8/4  
MR Clark 8/4

then p.a.

PS 8/4

CONFIDENTIAL



TOP COPY

GRS 31

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 11 APR 1974
NBR 25/48/1

(NB)

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 092236Z

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 100445Z

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 68 OF 9 APRIL 1974.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 105.

FOR MAITLAND.

1. RATHER THAN MAKE THIS A STICKING POINT WE CAN AGREE TO QUOTE  
SPECIAL ENVOY UNQUOTE.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED  
P & CD  
MR WEIR  
MR CAMPBELL

RESTRICTED



IMMEDIATE

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 100840Z APR.

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO <sup>121</sup>~~105~~ OF 10 APRIL 1974.

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. FOLLOWING IS AGREED TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE FOR PUBLICATION  
1500Z.

BEGINS.

''WITH THE OBJECT OF RESUMING DIPOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN  
THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AND BRITAIN AND IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE  
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES,  
A DELEGATION HEADED BY SIR DONALD MAITLAND SPECIAL ENVOY OF  
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT VISITED THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ FROM  
9 APRIL TO 11 APRIL.

AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS CONDUCTED BY THE BRITISH  
DELEGATION WITH THE COMPETENT IRAQI AUTHORITIES, THE TWO  
GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT  
AMBASSADOR LEVEL WITH EFFECT FROM 10 APRIL AND TO CONSOLIDATE  
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.


UNTIL AMBASSADORS ARE APPOINTED, THE HEADS OF THE  
INTERESTS SECTIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL ACT AS CHARGE  
D'AFFAIRES OF THEIR EMBASSIES''.

ENDS.

2. FOR GIPD PLEASE ENSURE BBC HAVE REVISED TEXT.

MCCLUNEY

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION:  
MED



COPY  
14  
12/4



WBS 26/4  
JNOTE FOR THE RECORD

The term "Special Envoy" was reluctantly agreed at the request of the Iraqis although it is not generally acceptable to us.

Protocol and Conference Department have asked that the use of this term in this instance should in no way be considered as a precedent for any future negotiations on resumption of relations with another country.

17 April 1974.

cc. Mr Collins, Protocol and Conference Department.



CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A

TOP COPY

94

FM BAGHDAD 101410Z APR.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 101630Z APR

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO 35 11 APR 1974 NBR 25/28/1
---

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 125 OF 10 APRIL 1974.

YOUR TELEGRAM <sup>120 [SIC]</sup> ~~125~~ : RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

FOLLOWING FROM MAITLAND.

1. I WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE DISCRETION IN YOUR TUR.
2. THIS MORNING WE AGREED THE FORMALITIES FOR RESUMING RELATIONS AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE AT 6 PM LOCAL TIME.
3. THE ATMOSPHERE AT BOTH THE OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL TALKS WITH SD TAQA AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ABDUL BAQI, (WHO IS A MEMBER OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL AND WHO LEFT HIS SICK BED TO RECEIVE ME) WAS BUSINESS-LIKE AND CORDIAL.
4. FOLLOWING WERE THE MAIN POINTS MADE BY THE IRAQIS SEMI COLON
  - A) THE MAIN REASON FOR THEIR INITIATIVE FOR RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WAS THAT THEY WANT OUR URGENT PARTICIPATION IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. THEY NEED OUR EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE.
  - B) SO FAR AS SPECIFIC PROJECTS ARE CONCERNED, THE IRAQIS' PRIORITIES ARE SEMI COLON
    - 1) EFFICIENCY SEMI COLON
    - 2) SPEED IN EXECUTION SEMI COLON
    - 3) REASONABLE COST.
  - C) THE IRAQIS WANT US TO SEND A DELEGATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. (THE IRAQIS WANTED A SENTENCE COMMITTING US TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE, BUT I RESISTED THIS).
  - D)

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

D) ON THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY, IRAQ HAS BEEN REASSURED BY YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 19 MARCH AND YOUR ENDORSEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN STATEMENT OF 6 NOVEMBER.

5. THE IRAQIS DID NOT REFER TO OUR POLICY ON VISAS.

6. I RAISED THE QUESTIONS OF ELLIS AND THE INDIAN STAFF AT THE END OF THIS MORNINGS MEETING. TAQA TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT A "POSITIVE OUTCOME" ON ELLIS NEXT WEEK. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED FROM DETENTION AND DEPORTED TO UK. ON THE INDIANS THERE SEEMES TO BE NOT GIVE IN THE IRAQI POSTION. OTHER MISSIONS ARE ALSO BEING ASKED TO REMOVE CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THEIR LOCAL STAFF. BUT WE SHOULD BE ALLOWED A REASONABLE INTERVAL BEFORE OURS HAVE TO GO.

7. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT, FOLLOWING THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, WE COULD EXCHANGE VIEWS FROM TIME TO TIME ON THE MAJOR ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN. THE IRAQIS DID NOT DEMUR.

8. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

MCCLUNEY

**FILES**

MED

PCD

POD

GIPD

NEWS D

PS

PS/MR HATTERSLEY

PS/MR ENNALS

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

MR WILFORD

MR TEBBIT

MR WHITEHEAD

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL  
SAVING TELEGRAM

95.

BY BAG  
FROM BAHRAIN  
CONFIDENTIAL

70.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY N-35 16 APR 1974 NBR 25/5481
--

TOP COPY

TO F C O TELNO 6 SAVING OF 9 APRIL 1974 INFO SAVING TO ABU DHABI  
DOHA, DUBAI, MUSCAT, KUWAIT, JEDDA, TEHRAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT,  
BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 60: UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

15/5/74

I MENTIONED THIS TO THE BAHRAIN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 8 APRIL.  
HE WHOLEHEARTEDLY APPROVED. ALTHOUGH THE BAHRAIN RULERS RESENT  
AND FEAR IRAQ'S AMBITIONS IN THE GULF, SHAIKH MOHAMMED SEES THAT  
THERE WILL BE NO PEACE IN THE AREA UNTIL IRAQ AND THE REST,  
PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA, ARE RECONCILED.

TESH


FILES  
MED  
NENAD  
N AM D  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
SIR J KILLICK

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIORITY  
CYPHER CAT A  
GRPS 460

CONFIDENTIAL



96

FM BAGHDAD 110800Z APR.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

94

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 127 OF 11 APRIL 1974. INFO  
ROUTINE BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, MUSCAT, JEDDA,  
KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, TEHRAN, PARIS, BONN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,  
BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, UK MIS NEW YORK.

123.  
MY TEL NO ~~128~~ ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS (NOT TO ALL).

SSB 26/T  
fa

FOLLOWING FROM MAITLAND.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE MY MAIN IMPRESSIONS OF CURRENT IRAQI  
ATTITUDES.

2. WHILE THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE REALISED THAT THEIR  
POOR INTERNATIONAL IMAGE WAS DOING THEM POLITICAL DAMAGE, THE  
MAIN REASON FOR THEIR DECISION TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH  
OURSELVES AND THE GERMANS WAS ECONOMIC. THE EAST EUROPEAN  
CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME WAS NOT PRODUCING  
THE RIGHT RESULTS QUICKLY ENOUGH. MOREOVER, THE VASTLY  
INCREASED FUNDS BECOMING AVAILABLE FOR DEVELOPMENT COULD NOT  
BE INVESTED IN THE COUNTRIES FUTURE BY THE EFFORT OF THE EAST  
EUROPEANS ALONE. THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHERS WAS THEREFORE  
NECESSARY.

3. WE AND THE GERMANS WILL BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE  
SPECIALISED EQUIPMENT AND SKILLS AND MORE EFFECTIVE  
COMPETITION FOR THE EAST EUROPEANS AS REGARDS COMPETENCE AND  
SPEED OF EXECUTION. FOR THE IRAQIS THE COST OF DEVELOPMENT  
IS NOW A RELATIVELY MINOR CONSIDERATION. BUT THIS DOES NOT  
MEAN THAT THEY WILL BE DETERRED FOR THE TIME BEING FROM  
CONTINUING TO SEEK CREDIT ABROAD.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. THE



4. THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP IS IN A HURRY. THEY RECOGNISE THAT THEY ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE IRANIANS AND THE SAUDIS (OF BOTH OF WHOM THEY ARE CONGENITALLY SUSPICIOUS) AND THAT THE EXPERTISE AND EQUIPMENT THEY NEED IS ALREADY SCARCE. THEY ALSO HAVE THEIR OWN PEOPLE TO WORRY ABOUT. DEVELOPMENT STAGNATED DURING THE 12 YEARS OF THE OIL DISPUTE AND THIS IS BECOMING WIDELY RECOGNISED. THE LEADERSHIP NOW PIN THEIR HOPES ON A CRASH PROGRAMME WHICH SHOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION BY RAISING THE LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTING PURCHASING POWER MORE WIDELY.

5. THE IRAQIS SUSPICIONS DIE HARD AND FOR THE TIME BEING THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION WITH US. BUT WE COULD CASH IN ON THE GOODWILL GENERATED BY THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS IF WE COULD SEND OUT THE ECONOMIC MISSION THEY HAVE ASKED FOR IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT NOT EXPRESS IT IN THESE TERMS, THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP'S MESSAGE TO US IS THIS : IF YOU MOVE QUICKLY THERE IS A KILLING TO BE MADE IN IRAQ.

6. ON ARAB/ISRAEL THE IRAQIS MAY BE MORE READY TO ACCEPT THE FACT OF THEIR OWN IMPOTENCE. THEY MAY THEREFORE ADVOCATE THEIR OWN IMPRACTICAL PROPOSALS WITH MORE DIFFIDENCE. BUT I DOUBT IF THEY WILL STOP SNIPING AT DR. KISSINGER, OR GIVING AID AND COMFORT TO PALASTINIAN ORGANISATIONS.

MCCLUNEY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

M E D  
ENERGY DEPT  
N E N A D  
T R E D  
E E S D  
F R D  
I R D  
G I P D  
NEWS DEPT

COPIES TO


DEPT OF TRADE  
DEPT OF INDUSTRY  
DEPT OF ENERGY





BRITISH EMBASSY

JEDDA



10 April 1974

3/20

T J Clark Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO

Mr. Burton

*Do we owe an apology? What was the priority of the FCO let 153? I think para. 3 is right.*  
*16/4*  
*PAF*  
*please enter 2 new but with refs 15/6/4*  
*John Terry*

UK/IRAQ

1. Please refer to FCO telegram no 60 of 4 April to Bahrain and to FCO telegram no 153 of 28 March to Paris, which reached us on Friday 5 April.
2. On 7 April, in the absence of the Ambassador in Riyadh, I took advantage of the discretion given to us and informed the Head of the Western Affairs Department in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the background to and purpose of Sir Donald Maitland's forthcoming visit to Baghdad. Shaikh Muhammad Nuri Ibrahim made no substantive comment, but his reaction was approving rather than otherwise.
3. Given Saudi Arabia's joint border with Iraq and the sensitiveness of the Saudis to developments affecting the Persian Gulf, we were surprised not to have been included in the original list of posts authorised to give advance information about Sir Donald Maitland's visit.


*Chas. etc.*  
*Horn*

H B Walker



Mr Clark

Mr Burton (o/r)



## IRAN AND ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

1 During the Iranian Ambassador's courtesy call on 5 April, the Minister of State informed him that Sir D Maitland would leave for Baghdad on 9 April. Mr Ennals explained that after the contacts on resumption which had already taken place it was hoped that this visit would cement Anglo/Iraqi relations. We saw advantage in having relations.

2 After Mr Wright had explained the background to the various Iraqi approaches and our response, Mr Afshar commented that he hoped the Iraqis would show the UK more good faith than they had to Iran. He told the Minister of State in confidence that Midhat Ibrahim Juma'h, the Iraqi Ambassador to Tehran, was known to have been responsible for the assassination of Tikriti in Kuwait. After some consideration of refusing him, the Iranian authorities had thought it better not to; "at least we knew with whom we were dealing".

3 The Iranian Ambassador went on to say that he was puzzled about what the Iraq Government were after and also by the recent border incidents. He believed Russian influence was growing in Iraq and that was the most effective way for the Russians to exert influence in the Lower Gulf. Mr Ennals pointed out that one of our reasons for working towards the resumption of relations with Iraq was to use whatever influence we had to diminish Soviet influence there.

P K Williams  
Middle East Department

10 April 1974

cc: Chancery, Tehran



73. PRINCES PARK AVE.,  
LONDON, NW11 0SS.  
17 APR 1974

(99)

Dear Mr Ballagham,

I have read in the Daily Telegraph that negotiations are being carried on with Iraq with a view to resuming Diplomatic Relations with that country.

No doubt you have read of Jewish women being raped and murdered, and seen pictures of Jewish men hanging from lamp-posts for no other crime than being born Jewish.

In view of your attitude to Chile, Greece, South Africa and Rhodesia this policy seems inconsistent to say the least.

Perhaps you will make a statement in the Commons as to why you want Diplomatic Relations with such a barbaric country and yet stop the Royal Navy visiting the above countries.

Yours sincerely

Henry Welby.

HENRY WELBY.


16/4.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1



Mr. Butler 17/4  
17/4

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has asked me to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 11 April about the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq.

Mr. Callaghan has asked me to say that your views have been noted.

(J. D. F. Holt)  
Private Secretary

Henry Welby, Esq.,  
73 Princes Park Avenue,  
London NW11 0JS.




PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 170930Z

RESTRICTED



TOP COPY

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 130 OF 17 APRIL INFO ROUTINE STOCKHOLM.

U.K./IRAQ RELATIONS.

25/548/1  
pa

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROTOCOL WHICH THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR  
WOULD LIKE TO SIGN IN BAGHDAD DATED 10 APRIL.

BEGINS.

WE THE UNDERSIGNED, REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN  
IN IRAQ AND HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ,  
AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

THAT THIS DAY, THE THIRTIETH OF MAY, THE  
GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN HAVE GIVEN UP AND HER BRITANNIC  
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
ALL BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ HITHERTO THE  
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN.

DURING THIS PERIOD OF SWEDISH PROTECTION OF  
BRITISH INTERESTS ALL FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE  
RESPONSIBILITIES REMAINED UNDER THE DIRECT CARE OF  
THE STAFF OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE  
EMBASSY.

DONE AT BAGHDAD THIS TENTH DAY OF APRIL 1974.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN

FOR HER BRITANNIC  
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT,

OTTO RATHSMAN  
AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY  
AND PLENIPOTENTIARY.

IAN MCCLUNEY  
CHARGE D' AFFAIRS A.I.



RESTRICTED

2. GRATEFUL FOR AUTHORITY TO SIGN THIS , OR A REVISED DRAFT.  
TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY IN  
BAGHDAD DO NOT HOLD ANY PROPERTY OF OURS.

MCCLUNEY

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION  
MED

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

102  
MED

GR 44

CYPHER CAT A

FM HAVANA 171457Z

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 22 APR 1974 NBR 25/578/1
--

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
--------------------------------

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 128 OF 17/4/74

1. TWO MIDDLE EAST HEADS OF MISSION (INCLUDING IRAQI) HAVE TOLD ME THAT RECENT BROADCAST ON BBC ARABIC SERVICE REFERRED TO RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND IRAQ.  
GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE.

FINGLAND

FILES

GIPD

MED

L A M D

RESTRICTED

GIPD informed all posts by telegram and air-mail (as they felt fit for each post) on 10/4/74 and Havana had obviously not by the 17th April received their Air-Mail letter. An interim Tel will be issued to Havana by GIPD.

PAF 18/4. pr





British Embassy,  
Baghdad.

G S Burton Esq.,  
Middle East Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London SW1.

17 April 1974

RECEIVED IN 375 REGISTRY No 35 22 APR 1974 NBR 25/28/1
--

Dear Graham,

UK/IRAQ RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

I enclose with this letter the following documents for your records.

- a) Record of conversation between Sd Shadhil Taqa and Sir D. Maitland.
- b) Note of conversation between Sd Martadha Saad Abdul Baqi al Hadithi and Sir D. Maitland.
- c) A minute prepared by Major J.Y. Sanders on Military Training in Iraq.
- d) A copy of the Royal Swedish Embassy note to Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally designating the Interests Section as an Embassy.
- e) A copy of our note to MFA enclosing a list of staff.


To follow. —

2. Peter Donovan is writing separately about Stanley Gardiners meeting at the MFA.

Yours ever  
la

I. McCluney  
Chargé d'Affaires





RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN SIR DONALD MAITLAND KCMG, AND  
SD SHADHIL TAQA AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BAGHDAD  
ON 10 APRIL 1974 at 8.30 A.M.

### Present

Sd Shadhil Taqa,  
Under Secretary of State,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sir Donald Maitland KCMG,  
Special Envoy of the  
British Government.

Dr Gailan Mahmoud Ramiz,  
Director, Western Section,  
Political Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr Stanley Gardiner,  
Department of Trade and  
Industry.

Miss Salima Bakr,  
Director Protocol Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr Graham Burton,  
Middle East Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Mr Ian McCluney,  
Head of British Interests Section.

Mr Peter Donovan,  
Commercial Secretary.

1. At Sd Shadhil Taqa's invitation Sir Donald Maitland opened. He said it was a personal pleasure to see for himself the developments in Iraq after his long absence. The policy of successive British Governments had been to tackle problems through personal contact. The problems facing the world were of two kinds, soluble and insoluble. The insoluble problems were those relating to food, raw materials and population, which nations had to work at together for the sake of humanity. All the other problems were soluble. Turning to international affairs, Mr Callaghan had said "the world was in a period of transformation". The present Special Assembly of the United Nations was concerned with that transformation. Since the events of last Autumn Britain and Western Europe had seen the world shrink and a new consciousness of economic interdependence emerge. Though Britain saw no immediate solution we were determined to make our contribution to solving the problems of this transformation.

British Foreign Policy.

2. Sir D. Maitland described the constant factors in British Foreign Policy:

#### a) East-West Relations

Britain supported the efforts towards "detente". We would continue to make every effort in the MBFR negotiations and in the European Security Conference, and hoped that these would lead to a free and easy relationship between the peoples of Eastern Europe and the British people, similar to that which had grown up between

/our.....





ourselves and our neighbours in Western Europe. Nevertheless there were strong military forces in Eastern Europe and Britain had to be vigilant, though we would continue to look for a reduction in tension.

Sd Shadhil Taqa said detente was acceptable provided it did not sacrifice the interests of small or backward peoples. He welcomed the achievements of the European Security Conference and the balanced reduction of arms in Europe.

Sd Taqa also said that Iraq was not a Communist Country, but that it did not pay at the same time to be anti-communist for the sake of the interests of others. Iraq served its own interests and the interests of those where the benefits derived would be mutual.

b) Relationship with neighbours in Western Europe.

Sir Donald Maitland said that Britain was a member of the European Economic Community and the new British Government were to examine with the EEC some of its policies. A renegotiation may begin soon. This was no bad thing for traditionally the EEC had progressed and gained strength through stages of apparent crisis. There may be among other members a wider desire to re-examine the EEC and its policies. We could not anticipate the result of the renegotiation which may well last many months.

c) Relationship with the USA

The recent publicised differences between Western Europe and the USA had related to specific issues. The British Government did not believe there were fundamental disputes but the process of political consultation in the EEC was in its early stages and procedures had not yet been worked out, either within Europe or between Europe and the United States for ensuring adequate consultation. It was a healthy sign that we were indulging in self criticism. There was a wide and solid basis of common interest.

d) Middle East

There was a difference in attitude between Europe and the United States on Middle East policy. Certainly the Americans wished to see a just and peaceful settlement but differed from Europe on method. For our part the Foreign Secretary supported Dr Kissingers efforts; though we did not propose to intervene we were ready to play a constructive role if those concerned should desire it. While any settlement should adhere to the lines of Resolution 242, opinion had evolved since then. The problem was not only of territory and peace, but of people. Mr Callaghan had expressed this in the words "Palestinian personality" and his ideas were now evolving. The Middle East was a close neighbour to Western Europe. The problem was intimate and a just solution must be found.

/Relations...





### Relations with Iraq

3. The British Government had welcomed the invitation to send a delegation to Baghdad to discuss a resumption of relations. Britain was willing to discuss with Iraq areas of co-operation in the economic, technical and cultural fields where there were obvious benefits for both sides. We hoped that we might also exchange ideas on some other problems which exist in the world. Governments could only serve their peoples if they approached wisdom through an exchange of ideas.

### Middle East

4. Sd Shadhil Taqa welcomed this opportunity for exchange of ideas and spoke about the Middle East. Iraq also felt the world was passing through a transformation. The events of Autumn 1973 were firstly military, and, as a result of these, economic problems had arisen. Iraq believed that the military events were not root cause but the result of happenings at the turn of the century. Britain had had a role at that time and if a balance sheet were drawn up he would not like to say who was the debtor and the creditor. The facts of history remained important both now and the future.

5. Sd Shadhil Taqa said that although the statements of Mr Callaghan and the BBC did not fully satisfy Arab ambitions they were accepted by Iraq as a realistic statement of British policy. Iraq wished the Prime Minister and his Government success. (By contrast the Prime Ministers statements during the election campaign had had a negative effect on Iraqis and all Arabs). He agreed with Mr Callaghan that the question of the Middle East was not just one of territory but of people and Iraq supported the idea of the Palestinians achieving political personality. Iraq may differ in the matter of method but in this they differed with Russia and even with some of the Arab countries. Iraq was not entitled to require of other states that they share her attitudes. But while Britain knew about problems of European security, Iraq knew about the problems of the Arab area. Sd Taqa asked that his bitterness and candour be excused, but it was necessary to be frank to achieve mutual understanding and friendship between peoples.

6. Sd Shadhil Taqa stressed the importance of peace in the Mediterranean for the security of Europe. That peace could not be achieved with an aggressive and expansionist Israel spreading like a cancer through the Arab body. He quoted a Zionist slogan of 1917 - "the state of Israel should extend from the Nile to the Euphrates". In 1947, 1948, 1956 and 1967 Israel had progressively enlarged itself and in 1973 they had crossed the Nile. Would they now move to the Euphrates? Europe should seek its own interests and not follow that of others. There were a hundred and twenty million Arabs to 3 million Zionists. It was axiomatic that Europe's interests lay with the one hundred and twenty million.





7. Iraq had met with bitterness in the Arab homeland since the time of the Ottoman Empire, an Empire followed by Western dominance in all its forms. When Britain had been large and influential the Zionists had recourse to her to achieve their dreams. Now they use the United States. In any future alignment of forces they may have recourse to another power - regardless of ideological considerations. Iraq respected Britain's interests and the interests of others. One should deal with other states on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. He called on Great Britain to pursue its own interests in the Arab world.
8. Iraq's line on the Middle East was unique and distinctive. Some Arab brothers and other friends thought them far too idealist. To achieve peace one must treat the root cause by:
- a) consulting the people
  - b) giving them the right of self determination
  - c) their own sovereignty
  - d) giving all the people be they Jew, Christian or Moslem, the option of choosing a democratic system of Government which will best serve their interests.

(Sd Taqa expressed his admiration of Lord George-Brown, but said in Resolution 242 he had gone for a compromise which would not work. There was an arab proverb "satisfying all is something unattainable". Sir D. Maitland replied that Lord George-Brown as a politician had achieved all that was possible in 1967, but a lot of water had flowed under the bridge since then.)

9. Sir D. Maitland said the fact of Israeli expansion was indisputable but they had now moved back and the Security Council had played a role in this. Britain believed different attitudes were arising in Israel. Sd Taqa replied that in the recent disengagement a retreat had begun, but it may well be to Israel's military advantage to retire across the canal and fortify positions in the passes in Sinai. It may also be to Israel's military advantage to retire from 300 sq kms of the Golan Heights because the area was sloping and difficult to defend.

10. Sd Taqa was worried about the future. 1974 might be over before further withdrawals took place; 1975 and 1976 may be taken up with the US Presidential election preparations and campaign. 1977 would be a wasted year while the new President studied the situation. Thus the Arabs would lose three years of their life. For a people and a nation this counted only as three minutes, but it was a mistake for men of an age like him self and Sir Donald to waste this time.

/Sir D. Maitland....





11. Sir Donald Maitland said there had been an evolution in world opinion to which the Arabs could look for support. Arab spokesmen had played a big part in this. Though disengagement was a military operation, more important was the fundamental rethinking going on in Israel and the world. Britain would continue to pursue her own interests in the area.

#### Washington Energy Conference

12. Sd Taqa said wisdom was required in solving economic problems. The Washington Energy Conference had been contrary to wisdom and indicative of intransigence. The energy crisis was due directly to US policy, a policy designed to harm European and particularly British interests. The United States wished to turn Europe and the Third World against the Arabs, portraying them as a savage people who would freeze the Europeans during winter. Dr Kissinger was far from wise. He should not emulate the sentiments of Metternich ~~in respecting and not respecting the feelings of other states~~. No one had a monopoly of wisdom. The economic effect of the energy crisis was that goods from Britain became more costly than those from the USA.

*The new administration agreed and concluded that the* 13. Sir D. Maitland said, with reference to the Conference, ~~that the previous British Government had insisted on a distinction between producers and consumers, and in any meeting between the~~ *custom* United Nations had a vital role to play. Sd Taqa agreed and referred to President Bakr's letter to Mr Nixon. He said no one had a right to monopolise wisdom or dominance. The United Nations with its agencies could solve all problems large or small.

#### Relations with Britain

14. Sd Taqa then said Iraq had asked Great Britain to resume diplomatic relations and to consider an agreement for economic and technical co-operation on the basis of mutual interest. There were wide vistas for co-operation between the two countries. Iraq had a massive development programme which was a race with time to build Iraqi society and personality. Iraq needed British technology and expertise. Britain in its turn needed raw materials and on this basis Iraq and Britain could co-operate. Iraq had evolved a special method of dealing with projects. There were three criteria:

- a) efficiency and quality specifications
- b) time of execution
- c) cost

The order of these priorities was intentional. The time element was extremely important. The method of co-operation with Japan was a good example but that between Iraq and Britain need not be an exact copy.

15. He mentioned the important Committee for the Implementation and Follow up of Oil Agreements (Oil Follow up Committee).

/Sir D.Maitland.....





Sir D. Maitland said the delegation would be glad to hear more of its work. Sd Taqa asked if the British side/to give some commitment to reaching an economic and technical co-operation agreement with Iraq. Sir D. Maitland agreed that in a statement on departure he would say that such an agreement would be the subject of a proposal of his in London for early talks between the British and Iraqi sides.

16. Sir D. Maitland spoke about Britains oil supplies. In the 1980's we could meet most of our oil needs from the North Sea, and in 1975 our gas supplies would all come from North Sea fields. There was rapid development in coal lifting techniques; Britain had large reserves of coal. Britains economic prospects were very good in the medium term, and we were often too modest in speaking of our advanced technology and future projects. We were dealing ingeniously with the problem of the "quality of life"; the country was seething with ideas more now than at anytime since the 18th Century. In the fields of Iraqs development Sd Taqa had earmarked we hoped to be able to contribute.

17. In a discussion on the form of the joint communique about the resumption of diplomatic relations. Sir D. Maitland agreed that he be called a "Special Envoy of the British Government".

18. Sd Taqa noted that the talks had been successful and useful. He thanked the British delegation, for they had found common ground on which to proceed to future relations and co-operation.

*lan W. Clancy*  
15 April 1974



CONFIDENTIAL

Note for the record

At the conclusion of the discussions this morning with Sd Shadhil Taqa and other officials at the MFA, I was received by the Iraqi Foreign Minister. Sd Taqa was also present.

The Foreign Minister had been briefed by Sd Taqa on our talks and he began by expressing the satisfaction of the Iraqi Government at their successful outcome. The resumption of diplomatic relations would provide a framework for co-operation in the economic, technological and agricultural fields. Sd Abdul Baqi al Hadithi then outlined in broad terms the objectives of Iraq's development plans, emphasising that speed in executing these was of prime importance.

*lyrical,* Sd Abdul Baqi then said that the popular image of Iraq was mistaken. The Iraqis were thought of as unreliable, unpredictable and unable to follow a steady course. Many people regarded Iraq as a centre of confusion and inconsistency. But the facts were otherwise. In the political field Iraq was opposed to the abuse of power and influence; she therefore based her relations with other countries on the principles of justice, mutual respect and co-operation in the common interest. In an allusion to Iran he said that Iraq did not want to go to war with anyone, but would resolutely resist any aggression on her territory. In the economic field Iraq asked nothing more than to co-operate with other countries in ways which served the interests of each. Concluding this opening statement Sd Abdul Baqi said that, while it was right that diplomatic relations should be restored between our two countries and that Ambassadors should be exchanged in due course, what mattered was co-operation in the interests of the two countries in the fields he had mentioned. Once again he stressed the need for rapid progress in his country's development plans.

In reply I expressed the British delegation's satisfaction at the outcome of the discussions. Before I had left London Mr Callaghan had asked me to convey to the Iraqi Government his pleasure at the prospect of resuming diplomatic relations and his hopes for future co-operation between our two countries. I said that on our return to London we would study urgently a proposal made earlier in the day by the Iraqi delegation that a British mission be sent to Iraq to explore the possibility of concluding an agreement on economic and technical co-operation. It was clearly important that we co-operate in these fields. We each stood to benefit. At the same time I hoped that the resumption of diplomatic relations would enable us to exchange views from time to time on some of the major issues which concerned us both. In our view this could be mutually beneficial. I had certainly profited from the broad discussion I had had with Sd Taqa; and it had been helpful to hear the Minister himself express his Government's point of view.

/In reply.....



In reply Sd Abdul Baqi repeated many of his earlier points, stressing once again the importance his Government attached to pressing on urgently with Iraq's development. There were excellent opportunities for British enterprises in Iraq and his Gov. wanted their co-operation.

Sd Abdul Baqi concluded the meeting by thanking me for the part I had played in the Security Council debate on the dispute between Iraq and Iran. The British attitude had been fair and constructive.



10th April 1974



Sir Donald Maitland  
c.c. G. S. Burton  
S. Gardiner

RESTRICTED Reference 10/1

## Military Training Programme for Iraq

### General

1. Since the break in diplomatic relations the training of Iraqis both from the Army and Air Force has continued. There has been no training provided for the Iraqi Navy.

### Training 1971 -73

2. A fairly extensive programme of training had been arranged for 1971/72 which went on uninterrupted but over the last year my predecessor received a fairly negative response from the Iraqis with a consequent reduction in applications for courses. Of 15 places offered on courses in England for 1973/74 for the Army only 3 were accepted. The IAF training continued on a much reduced scale, but with fewer refusals by the IAF.

### Present Attitudes

3. Since my arrival there has been an appreciable softening in attitudes, a more positive and friendlier approach and an earnest desire by the Iraqis to continue and extend their links with the British Services.

### Future Intentions

4. Despite their large purchases of Russian and Eastern bloc equipment the Iraqis continue to use our doctrine and tactics and have expressed a wish to continue to do so. The report of the 8th Regional Party Congress is said to have highlighted the problems which arose in the October war when the Syrian Forces, Russian equipped and following Russian tactics and doctrine attempted to work with the Iraqi forces, Russian equipped but continuing to use western tactics and doctrine. From recent conversations with my Indian and French colleagues it would seem at the moment that the Iraqis are sending teams to the Indian and Russian Staff Colleges as well as our own to assess the merits of all three and make a final decision on which course to follow or alternatively take what they consider to be the best of all three Courses. An instructor from the Iraqi Army Staff College is about to visit Camberley and the Commandant of the IAF Wing of the Staff College is visiting our RAF Staff College next month.

/5.....

RESTRICTED

DD 737719 557644 500M 2/71 GM 3643/2



Current and Future Courses

5. Details of our current course commitment and future bids are as follows:

- a. IAF Officers at present or about to go on Courses in UK 10
- b. Army Officers at present or about to go on Courses in UK 8
- c. IAF Bids for Courses in UK 1974/75 42
- d. Army Bids for Courses in UK 1974/75. Bids not yet received but anticipated at circa 50-70.

These figures will bring us back near to the level of our training commitment before the break in diplomatic relations.

Staff College and RMAS

6. These are the two prestige courses for which the Iraqis continue to press for very hard. They invariably select their best officers and on current but incomplete information former students hold the following position in the Iraqi Services.

IAF

Brig. Na'mat el Dulaymi	Chief of Air Defence 1965 Course
Brig. Taha Ahmed	Commandant IAF Staff College 1966 Course
Wing Comd. Ahmad Khairi	G1 Trg (Air) MOD 1971 Course
Brig. Husain Hayawi al Tikriti	Commander IAF

He would have attended Bracknell had a vacancy been available. Instead he went to the Indian Air Force Staff College

ARMY (information not complete)

Brig. Tariq al Tawfiq	Director Military Training
Lt. Co. Nama Faris	DS Staff College

RMAS

7. We have maintained a steady flow of students to RMAS although this year they have bid for four vacancies and I have been warned they will only get one of these.

Army Staff Course

8. We have refused them vacancies since 1972 and their bid for 1975 has again been turned down. They are particularly upset about this.

RAF Staff Course

9. We have refused them vacancies since 1971 and their bid for 1975 is at present the subject of a special case



put up by us to FCO.

10. Should we wish to make a gesture to the Iraqi services which would be highly appreciated and would be of benefit to us in that we would continue to train future potential senior Commanders, a vacancy on both the Army and RAF Staff Course for 1975 would be ideal or a vacancy on either one would be an acceptable second best.

*J.Y. Sanders*  
J.Y. Sanders  
Major





Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 19 APR 1974 NBR 25/28/11
--

Your reference

Our reference

Date 19.4.74

155 24/74  
pc

My dear Ian,

Two quicker to catch the non-conf  
by just clearing.

① your tel 130.

I am still trying to trace an exchange  
with the Swedes at the time of the break.  
Meanwhile what is the significance of  
"the thirtieth of May" particularly as you  
wish to date the paper "10 April" Am I  
being thick?

② passing cutlery on Resumption. Thank you



For them I see Donald is described  
as special "representative"! We can't  
win! May we see the extracts from  
the Arabic press if you have them?  
Yours etc  
Graham.

My dear Mary,  
Two weeks ago I wrote the receipt  
for your check.  
I am still trying to trace our money  
with the bank of the town of the bank.  
I think it will be the right one if  
the title of "The" is put in as you  
want to see the paper. I am sorry  
that I have not been able to find  
it.





1 epu  
Mr. Campbell  
Private Secretary

17/4  
Type as amended.  
pa Q

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
24 APR 1974  
NBA 25/528/1

IRAQ

Now that we have re-established relations with Iraq, it would be appropriate to send a message of thanks to the Swedish Government for their assistance in looking after our interests there since 1971.

2. I attach a draft message which the Secretary of State might send to the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, via H.M. Embassy in Stockholm. I also attach a draft letter which Mr. Campbell might send to the Swedish Ambassador in Baghdad.

I have  
set in  
APR

T.J. Clark  
Middle East Department

17 April 1974





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

17 April 1974

His Excellency  
Mr Otto Rathsman  
Royal Swedish Embassy  
Baghdad

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 24 APR 1974 NBR 25/528/1
--

*Your Excellency,*

*26/4  
NBR pc*

Now that diplomatic relations have been resumed between the United Kingdom and Iraq, I should like, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, to express our deep gratitude to you for your efforts on behalf of British interests in Iraq.

Since you arrived in Baghdad at the end of last year, we have been extremely appreciative of the help and advice you have readily made available to us and for your assistance in ensuring the success of Sir Donald Maitland's recent visit to Baghdad.

I wish you all success and happiness for the remainder of your tour in Baghdad.

*Believe me, Your Excellency,*

*Yours sincerely*

*A H Campbell*

A H Campbell  
Deputy Under-Secretary of State






Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

22 April, 1974



*Ph 23/4*

*Mr. Burgess 23/4*  
*pa*

As you will know, we re-established diplomatic relations with the Iraq Government on 10 April.

I am most grateful to the Swedish Government and particularly to you, for all the care and concern Sweden gave to British interests while acting as protecting power over the years since 1971 when the Iraqis broke off relations with us. Would you please pass on my special thanks to the officials at the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad who have always been ready with help and advice.

(JAMES CALLAGHAN)

His Excellency Mr. Sven Andersson



GRS 30  
PRIORITY  
EN CLAIR

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
23 APR 1974  
NBR 25/28/11

FM BAGHDAD 220810Z APR.

UNCLASSIFIED

101

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 135 OF 22 APRIL 1974.

MY TEL NO 130 OF 17 APRIL.  
UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.

FOURTH LINE OF PROTOCOL. FOR "THE THIRTIETH OF MAY"  
READ "THE TENTH OF APRIL."

DONOVAN

FILES  
MED  
P & CD  
NEWS D  
MP WEIR

26/4  
ja



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
26 APR 1974

H B Walker Esq  
JEDDA

Your reference

Our reference

Date 24 April 1974

NBR 25/548/1

UK/IRAQ

1. Thank you for your letter of 10 April.
2. I have noted the point in your paragraph 3. We did, of course, give you advance authority (our tel 60 to Bahrain) some 5 days before the resumption was effected but on reflection, I agree that we should perhaps have given you the same earlier discretion as Kuwait and Tehran. My apologies.

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

26/4  
for

CONFIDENTIAL



RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY N-35  
26 APR 1974  
NBR 25/248/1

Mr Wright

Flags A & B  
(101) (108)

Flag C

wf  
NEQ 3/248/1(72)

Flag B

BAGHDAD TELS NOS 130 AND 135: PROTOCOL WITH THE SWEDES


- 1 I have been unable to find a precedent for such a procedure. We exchanged a memorandum with the Swedes about their protection of our interests in Iraq dated 7 February 1972.
- 2 P&CD, N&TD and the Legal Advisers could accept the text as it stands (subject to the alteration of the date in line 4 as per Baghdad tel no 135) but ideally would prefer to see certain other amendments as set out in the attached draft telegram.



G S Burton  
Middle East Department

25 April 1974

tel. has issued



per



1. Ack.  
2. Des for Mr. B. J.

73, PRINCES PARK AVE.,  
LONDON, NW11 0JS  
22-4-74.

(111)

(100)

Dear Mr. Gallagher,

Your Secretary's reply

to my letter of 11<sup>th</sup> April is both evasive  
and unsatisfactory.

RECEIVED IN  
RECORDING  
28 APR 1974  
NBR 25/248/1.

(99.) I would like a straight-  
forward answer please, how do you  
equate your attitude to Iraq with  
your attitude to Greece, Chile,  
South Africa and Rhodesia?

As I pointed out in my  
first letter the Iraqis have raped &  
murdered Jewish women and hanged  
Jewish men from lamp-posts for no  
other crime than being born Jewish.  
I'm sure we can do without Diplomatic  
Relations with such people.

Yours sincerely,

Henry Welby.  
HENRY WELBY.

Mr James Gallagher M.P.,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London. S.W.1.





112

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1



111.

Mr. Callaghan has asked me to thank you for your letter of 22 April about foreign policy towards Iraq.

A reply will be sent in the near future.

See 114.

(R. N. Dales)  
Private Secretary

Henry Welby, Esq.,  
73 Princes Park Avenue,  
London, NW11 0JS



GPS 65  
CYPHER CAT A

RESTRICTED

REC 1/11
REGISTRY N 35
29 APR 1974
(NBR 25/248/1)

113

FM FCO 251915Z APR

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TEL NO 75 OF 25 APRIL 1974  
INFO STOCKHOLM

YOUR TELS NOS 130 AND 135 (NOT TO STOCKHOLM): SWEDISH  
PROPOSAL

1 WE SHOULD PREFER THE DOCUMENT TO BE DESCRIBED AS A "DECLARATION"  
RATHER THAN A "PROTOCOL". WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING  
ALTERATIONS TO THE TEXT IN YOUR TEL NO 130:  
(A) LINE 3: INSERT "DECLARE" FOR "AGREE"  
(B) LINE 4: INSERT "THE TENTH OF APRIL" FOR "THE  
THIRTIETH OF MAY"  
(C) LINE 6: INSERT "REASSUMED" FOR "ASSUMED".

CALLAGHAN

FILES:

MED

P & C D

NEWS D

N & T D

MR. CAMPBELL

MR. WEIR

MR. WILFORD

COPIES TO:

MR. BATSTONE, LEGAL ADVISER

RESTRICTED






Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

30 April 1974

Henry Welby Esq  
73 Princes Park Avenue  
London NW11 0JS



I have been asked to reply to your letter of 22 April to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about the recent resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq.

Her Majesty's Government have long held the view that the establishment of diplomatic relations provides the most convenient channel for presenting our views and opinions to the governments of other countries; for this reason, Her Majesty's Government deplore the arbitrary breaking of such relations, in the conviction that such action is in neither party's best interests. In itself, and we have made this clear on numerous occasions, the establishment of diplomatic relations with another government in no way implies approval or disapproval of that government's policies; moreover, we need to have diplomatic relations in order to look after the interests of UK nationals who live and work in that country and to promote our exports there.

You refer specifically to the plight of the Jewish community in Iraq. Despite a number of reports, at the end of 1972 and the beginning of last year, that Jews were being persecuted there, we were unable to confirm that the position of Jews in Iraq had deteriorated noticeably.

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department



(115)

**D E C L A R A T I O N**

**We the undersigned, representing the Government of Sweden in Iraq and Her Britannic Majesty's Government in Iraq, declare as follows:**


**That this day, the Tenth of April, the Government of Sweden have given up and Her Britannic Majesty's Government have reassumed responsibility for all British interests in Iraq hitherto the responsibility of the Government of Sweden.**

**During this period of Swedish protection of British interests all financial and administrative responsibilities remained under the direct care of the staff of the British Interests Section of the Embassy.**


**Done at Baghdad this Tenth day of April 1974.**

**For the Government  
of Sweden**

**For Her Britannic  
Majesty's Government**

  
**Otto Rasmussen**  
**Ambassador Extraordinary  
and Plenipotentiary**



  
**Ian MacLure**  
**Charge**





RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
- 7 MAY 1974

NBR 25/28/1.

The British Embassy,  
Baghdad.

27 April, 1974

The Hon Martin Buckmaster,  
Guidance & Information Policy Dept,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London SW1.

45/15  
f

#### GIFT BOOKS IN IRAQ

When Sir Donald Maitland came to Iraq to negotiate a resumption of diplomatic relations, the Under Secretary at the Foreign Ministry unexpectedly presented Sir Donald and the members of his delegation with some small silver souvenirs (cigarette containers and ashtrays).

2. It was necessary for us to find quickly some means of repaying this gift. Fortunately the British Council came to our rescue and allowed us to "borrow" some new books which had just arrived for their library. We presented these to the members of the Iraqi team at the negotiations with a personal note from Sir Donald Maitland.

3. I enclose a list of the books and the recipients. Is it possible for you to replace these books from presentation funds, so that I may replenish the Council library?

I. McCluney

Encs.

c.c. CRD  
MED



Books presented

SD SHADHIL TAQA - Under Secretary

- "History of Western philosophy" - Bertrand Russell
- "Dictionary of 20 Cent. Art" - Phaidon
- "Traffic in Towns" - Doe

SD QASIM KHALIL - Protocol Officer

- "The Oxford book of Light Verse" - V.H. Auden
- "The British Isles" - G.H. Dury
- "Forewards and Afterwards" - W.H. Auden

MISS SALIMA BAKR - First Secretary

- "Survival" - D.R. Arthur
- "The First Great Civilisation" - J. Hawkes
- "English Larousse" - Longman

SD SHAWKI - Counsellor

- "The Lonely Tower" - T.R. Henn (Yeats)
- "Longmans English Course" - Longman

DR RAMIZ - Director - Western Section, MPA.

- "The Cat and the Trumpet" - M. Valenay
- "Guide to Literary London" - G.C. Williams




TOP COPY

FM BAGHDAD 060655Z MAY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 146 OF 6 MAY 1974, INFO  
ROUTINE BEIRUT AND DISTRESSFCO

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS.



AT PRESIDENTS DINNER FOR AMIN LAST EVENING U/SECY TAQA TOLD ME THAT, AS A GESTURE OF THEIR GOODWILL AND DESIRE TO BEGIN THIS NEW ERA OF UK/IRAQ RELATIONS WITH A CLEAN SLATE, ROBERT ELLIS (AGED 74 AND DETAINED ON SECURITY GROUNDS SINCE NOVEMBER '73) WOULD BE RELEASED WITHIN THE NEXT 15 DAYS.

Further papers on Mr Ellis to be found on NBR/EPH.

2. I THANKED TAQA FOR THIS WELCOME NEWS WHICH HE SPECIALLY WISHES TO BE CONVEYED TO SIR DONALD MAITLAND. IN VIEW OF THE UNREASONABLE WAY IN WHICH ELLIS HAS BEEN DETAINED, AND IS NOW TO BE EXPELLED, I DID NOT THINK IT RIGHT TO BE OVER IMPRESSED BY THIS SIMPLE CIVILISED ACT. NEVER-THE-LESS IT IS A GOOD SIGN, AND A QUICK RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST 4 MAY FOR HIS EARLY RELEASE.

3. TAQA ALSO MENTIONED THE VISIT TODAY OF ITALIAN ECONOMIC MINISTER BENSI, AND HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT BE TOO RELUCTANT TO SEND AN ECONOMIC DELEGATION. WE MUST NOT HANG BACK. LINKS WITH BRITAIN WERE CLOSE AND THERE WAS MUCH TO BE GAINED FROM EARLY PROGRESS TO AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT.

4. ELLIS WILL LEAVE THE COUNTRY IMMEDIATELY. I HAVE ASKED TO BE TOLD (A) WHERE HE WILL GO (B) WHAT HIS WISHES ARE REGARDING HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED  
CONS D  
NEWS D  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR

Miss Fothergill  
I ensure that a copy of this is sent to Mr Gardner in J of 9/5.  
H. J. 1/5



RESTRICTED

118

BRITISH EMBASSY  
STOCKHOLM

3/10

3 May 1974

P R H Wright Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO

RECEIVED IN REENTRY N 35
13 MAY 1974
NBR 25/248/1

I thought we had made -  
to the Swedish Ambassador in  
Baghdad?

Dear Patrick,

SWEDISH CHARGE OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ

We have been following the exchange of telegrams, of which the latest to reach us is FCO to Baghdad no 75 of 25 April, about winding up this business.

2. The Swedes have been rather protocolaire about it. However, I do think that when you are satisfied that everything is in order, ~~with~~ might send them thanks for all they have done on our behalf since relations were broken. May I suggest that this could take the form either of a letter from the Secretary of State to the Swedish Foreign Minister, Herr Sven Andersson; or of one from the PUS to his opposite number, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Herr Sverker Åström?

Yours ever

Philip

P L V Mallet

RESTRICTED



9 May 1974

## Diplomatic Report

## RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

Diplomatic relations with Iraq were resumed on 10 April 1974 after a break of over 2 years. During the interim a British Interests Section without political responsibility served in Baghdad under the Swedish flag. A similar Interests Section operated in London for the Iraqis under the Afghan flag.

2. Diplomatic relations were broken off by Iraq on 30 November 1971. Iraq claimed that Britain had, in her withdrawal from the Gulf islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa, allowed these to fall into non Arab hands. This was seen as part of a wider plot to replace western imperialism in the Arab area with Iranian imperialism. It is probable that contributory factors to the break in diplomatic relations were the expulsion of three UK based staff from the Baghdad Embassy in October 1971 and the continuing dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company on the matter of royalties and production.

3. Negotiations took place with the Iraqis through the Swedish Embassy on the terms of reference for the British Interests Section. Following the break a UK based staff of up to 13 were allowed to remain in Iraq. A similar number were retained by the Iraqis in London. The Section was empowered to handle Commercial, Consular, Administrative and Cultural work. It had no brief for political observation or reporting. However the Iraqis agreed that full communications facilities could remain and the Swedes did not monitor these or our correspondence except in a general way.

4. The break in diplomatic relations occurred as the dispute between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Iraq Government reached its height. In broad terms the Iraqis wished the oil companies to increase their production, while they argued that the low price of oil made it uneconomic to export larger quantities and began to reduce the throughput of the Kirkuk-Mediterranean pipeline. The situation of the companies was already unhappy as all but a small fraction of their concession area had been nationalised in 1960 and the companies had refused to pay oil royalties since that time. On 1 June 1972 the Iraq Government nationalised the Iraq Petroleum Company, the main producer of oil in northern Iraq. British personnel in Kirkuk were required to leave and for a time the flow of oil through the northern pipeline ceased.

/The .....



The Government did not nationalise the Basrah Petroleum Company operating in the south nor the small Mosul Petroleum Company. Supplies of Iraqi oil from the Mediterranean terminals were discontinued to all except the French shareholders, Compagnie Francaise de Petroles. The loss of revenue from this oil caused hardship in Iraq and resulted in a number of barter deals, oil for goods with Eastern Bloc countries and others. Contacts between the Government and the companies continued during 1972 and early in 1973 a settlement was reached whereby oil supplies were restored to former IPC Shareholders and Iraq began again to earn oil royalties. As part of the settlement the Mosul Petroleum Company was nationalised, without compensation, but this was no great loss as it was becoming technically uneconomic.

5. In late 1973 the American, Dutch and Portugese shares of the Basrah Petroleum Company were nationalised by Iraq during the Middle East hostilities. This further increased Iraq's share in her own oil and the increase in oil prices at the end of 1973 made Iraq a rich country.

6. It had always been Britain's intention to resume diplomatic relations with Iraq at the earliest opportunity provided she made the first move. Attempts were made in 1973 to indicate this to the Iraqis through the French but there was no response at first.

7. In early 1974 following the Eighth Regional Conference of the Baath Party, French Foreign Minister Jobert was told by Vice President Saddam Hussein that Iraq envisaged an early resumption of diplomatic relations with Britain and Germany. This followed a decision of the Conference that Britain's stand on Arab/Israel was neutral so far as the Arabs were concerned, as shown in the 6 November European Declaration. Iraq could therefore justify relations with countries such as Britain and Germany on the grounds of mutual advantage through trade and economic co-operation.

8. Iraq's Chargé d'Affaires in Paris then approached the British Ambassador on 9 February indicating that the Iraqi Government would welcome a ministerial visit to discuss diplomatic relations and future economic co-operation. Thus Iraq had made the move for which we had been waiting and it was for us to respond. The message was repeated by Iraq's UN representative Talib Shabib to Sir Donald Maitland in New York on 14 February. Iraq was ready at any time to receive a British mission to discuss the restoration of diplomatic relations and economic matters.



9. A problem of responding to the Iraqi approach in February was that our own General Election was due on 28 February. It was not possible to make any decision about a ministerial visit until after the new government had taken office. In the meantime West Germany had been similarly approached and responded quickly. Their delegation headed by Dr Sachs, an Under Secretary, arrived in Baghdad on 25 February. He unexpectedly found that Vice President Saddam Hussein was in Moscow and no decisions could be taken until his return. However, after kicking their heels for three days Saddam returned, and on 28 February diplomatic relations were resumed.

10. On 28 March, a month later, the Secretary of State was able to say he welcomed the prospect of holding talks in Baghdad with a view to resuming diplomatic relations. He proposed that Sir Donald Maitland should undertake such a mission on 9 April. This message was passed to the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Paris on 29 March and two days later I, as Head of the British Interests Section in Baghdad, was called to meet the Under Secretary Shadhil Taqa in Baghdad.

11. Taqa spoke generally of Britain's wise and objective attitude during the Security Council exchanges on the Iraq/Iran border clashes and of the Secretary of State's views on the Middle East as expressed in his House of Commons statement on 19 March. He described the mutual interests of Britain and Iraq. While they needed sophisticated modern technology, Britain needed raw materials and energy resources. He hoped we could gain contracts in Iraq which would help our balance of payments. The time was right for a resumption for which they would not lay down pre-conditions.

12. We quickly agreed a programme for Sir Donald's short visit and the text of a communique (Annex A) to be released on 10 April when relations would be resumed. The only problem as it turned out was the description of Sir Donald. While the Iraqis wished, not un-naturally, to describe him as an Under Secretary to match their own side at the talks, we thought it better to be accurate and call him simply a Special Representative of the British Government. In the event we compromised on Special Envoy.

13. So we proceeded to talks. In a business and cordial atmosphere the Iraqis made clear their main reason for resuming diplomatic relations - they wanted our urgent participation in their development programme. They needed our experience and expertise. They wanted projects executed efficiently, quickly and at reasonable cost; and in that order of priority. Iraq would like to see an economic delegation from Britain as soon as possible to study the possibility of concluding an economic and technical co-operation agreement. Sir Donald took this proposal back to London for urgent consideration.



14. On the Middle East generally Iraq was reassured by the Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons on the 19 March and our endorsement to the European statement of 6 November. For our part we expressed the hope that following the resumption ~~resumption~~ of diplomatic relations we could exchange views from time to time on the major issues of common concern. The Iraqis did not demur at this.

15. If we look for reasons why the Iraqi leadership resumed relations with us and the West Germans on economic grounds we see that the East European contribution to the development programme was not producing the right results quickly enough. Moreover the vastly increased funds becoming available for development could not be invested in Iraq's future by the effort of the East Europeans alone. The participation of others is therefore necessary. The Iraqis are in a hurry for they recognise they are being left behind by the Iranians and other Arabs and that expertise and equipment is scarce. Development has stagnated during the oil dispute and the Baath leadership pin the hopes for their own future on a crash programme which will strengthen their position by raising the level of employment by distributing the purchasing power more widely.

*I. McCluney*

I. McCluney  
Chargé d'Affaires

Annex A

"With the object of resuming diplomatic relations between the Republic of Iraq and Britain and in order to consolidate economic and technical co-operation between the two countries, a delegation headed by Sir Donald Maitland Special Envoy of the British Government visited the Republic of Iraq from 9 - 11 April.

As a result of the talks conducted by the British delegation with the competent Iraqi authorities, the two Governments agreed to resume diplomatic relations at Ambassador level with effect from 10 April and to consolidate economic and technical co-operation between the two countries.

Until Ambassadors are appointed, the Heads of Interests Sections of the two countries will act as Chargé d'Affaires of their Embassies".





BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

119

RECEIVED IN <del>REGISTER</del> 35 16 MAY 1974
NBR 25/28/1

Dear Graham,

One of the many things we do not have in Baghdad is a copy of DSP Volume 2 which tells us how to set out a diplomatic report.

Neither do we receive reports or despatches from other posts yet, so I have no guide to current subjects & styles. However I have prepared a report about our own little occasion in Iraq which the department may wish to PA for the sake of old times y  
yoursever  
Car.



Mr Clark  
Mr Wright

Agree with these recommendations. Some  
amendments to the draft letter.

*John*  
7/5

# RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1 Mr McCluney has sent the attached diplomatic report on the events surrounding the resumption last month. As you will see from the covering manuscript note, he was hampered in its compilation by the lack of the relevant volume of DSP in Baghdad and it is not therefore possible for the report to be printed and circulated in ~~his~~ present form.

2 It is a useful diary of events (nothing like it was prepared after the resumption in 1969) and will serve as a useful guide should a similar situation arise in future. I recommend that copies be sent to Protocol & Conference Department, and CRE in the Department of Trade and that Mr Wright reply to Mr McCluney along the lines of the attached draft.

*GSB*

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

16 May 1974

1 apm. *John* version. There were  
some misprints in the Report. Pl. check before  
copying.

*John*  
17/5



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

I McCluney Esq  
British Embassy  
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

Date 17 May 1974

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY N 35 22 MAY 1974 NBR 25/588/1
---

4/2/1  
19

RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS

1 Thank you for your interesting report of 9 May. Such a report on the previous resumption would have been a useful precedent for us here in the preparation of the plans for Sir Donald Maitland's visit. I hope, however, that it will not be necessary in future to refer to your report in a similar context! I have arranged for copies to be sent to all interested parties in Whitehall but with the economies urged on us recently in the use of paper I felt bound to advise that your report should not be sent for printing.

2 I am glad that your report presents me with an ideal opportunity to say how much we here have appreciated your efforts in Baghdad during the last two years in conditions which can never have been easy. I know that Sir Donald Maitland was most grateful for all the arrangements made on his behalf both by the staff and yourself and I am sure that in your final months you will be a great help to Dick Giddens during his settling-in period.

3 It was good to see you here for the Conference.

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

cc: POD (for Para 2).

CONFIDENTIAL



## NOTE FOR THE FILE

c.c. G S Burton  
MED, FCO.

I made a courtesy call on MFA Under Secretary Sd Jamali on 18 April. He told me that Iraq welcomed the resumption of relations with Britain. He had been present at our reception and talked at length to Sir Donald Maitland, whom he knew from Cairo.

2. He said that in 1971 when relations were broken, Iraq had felt that Britain had a responsibility to ensure that the Island of Abu Musa and the Tumbs remained in Arab hands. This was what Sir William Luce had told him during his visit here at that time. When Britain failed to arrange this, Iraq had taken a political decision to break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

3. He said that Iraq now had the will and determination to enter into close economic and cultural co-operation with Britain. They already had arranged for large development projects to be undertaken by the French and to some extent the Italians, but they wished to see Britain do more than these other countries. It was easier for the Iraqis to work with the British with whom they had had long experience. I said that of course our business had continued even without diplomatic relations but Jamali replied that Britain was not involved yet in any of the major projects here.

4. He spoke about Palestine and said there was a need for the world to realise that the Palestinians were entitled to a country.

5. Talking of Iraqs relations with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, Sd Jamali said that Russia was a good friend of theirs but there were many issues on which Iraq and Russia did not agree. One of these was Palestine.

I. McCluney  
28 April, 1974





**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN REGISTER N 35 - 3 JUN 1974
Our reference NBR 25/48/1

P L V Mallet Esq  
Stockholm

Your reference

Our reference

Date

3 June 1974

*Dear Philip,*

**SWEDISH CHARGE OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ**

1. Thank you for your letter of 3 May. On our recommendation, the Secretary of State did in fact sign a letter to Herr Andersson, and it was despatched by the Private Office under flying seal on 22 April. I attach a copy of this letter and should be grateful if you would check that the original did indeed reach you and was subsequently forwarded to the Swedish Foreign Minister.

2. I also attach a copy of a letter dated 17 April which Alan Campbell sent to the Swedish Ambassador in Baghdad.

*Your cm.*

*Rich*

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

Encs 2

*s/c  
WFB pa*



Mr Clark 30/5  
Mr Wright

Flag A

Mr Mallet's letter of 3 May

I am afraid this letter had got  
buried. I now attach a draft reply  
to Stockholm. Private office assume me  
that all such letters go under flying  
seal for onward transmission by ~~air~~ H.M.  
Embassy.

W.B. 30/5-

John Wilson.

See 122

W.B. 3/8  
pa



BRITISH EMBASSY  
STOCKHOLM

123

3/10

12 June 1974

P R H Wright Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 20 JUN 1974 NBR 25/548/1
--

L. Brundage 17/6  
pa  
pr - sp =

Dear Patrice,

SWEDISH CHARGE OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 3 June. I can confirm that the letter signed by the Secretary of State did reach the Swedish Foreign Minister, though it did not come via this Embassy. Perhaps it went through the Swedish Embassy in London? At any rate it reached its destination.

Yours ever,

Philip

P L V Mallet



STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
30 JUL 1974  
NBR 25/52/1

Chief Clerk to see.

Head of News Department for action

1. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the following announcement to be made at the 12.30 pm News Conference on Tuesday, 23 July.

"The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr J A N Graham CMG to be HM Ambassador to Iraq following the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Iraq".

2. Mr Graham will take up his new appointment during the second half of September. I attach a copy of his curriculum vitae.

R E Parsons

18 July 1974

Copies to: Miss Fisher (with copy of CV)  
Miss Moore  
Miss Easton  
Mr Crawford  
Mr J S Whitehead  
Miss Gardner  
✓ Mr P R H Wright

*[Handwritten signature]*  
4/7

*[Handwritten signature]* 17/7  
*[Handwritten signature]* 22/7  
An *[Handwritten signature]* +

*[Handwritten signature]* 29/7  
Enter pa. li *[Handwritten signature]* 29/7  
*[Handwritten signature]* 30/7

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE



IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

GRPS 330

FM BAGHDAD 111030Z AUG.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 120800Z AUG.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO ACCOM 37 OF 11 AUGUST 1974  
INFO DOE.

YOUR TEL NO ACCOM 036 OF 7 AUGUST : RESIDENCE FOR AMBASSADOR.

1. OF THE HOUSES INSPECTED BY REEVES, ONLY ONE MEETS THE REQUISITE STANDARDS. IT COMPRISES 2 GOOD RECEPTION ROOMS AND DINING ROOM ALL INTER-COMMUNICATING BY FOLDING DOORS, EXCELLENT LARGE MASTER-BEDROOM/DRESSING ROOM/BATHROOM ALL EN SUITE, 2 BEDROOMS WITH 1 BATHROOM AND BREAKFAST ROOM/KITCHENETTE ON FIRST FLOOR. DUCTED A/C COOLING/HEATING EQUIPMENT. EXTERNAL 2 SERVANT ROOMS AND TOILET, MEDIUM SIZE GARDEN APPROACHED FROM WIDE VERANDAHS AND COVERED PARKING FOR 2/3 CARS. IN NEEDS NO (NO) STRUCTURAL ALTERATIONS AND, SUBJECT TO CONCLUSION OF SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT, COULD BE READY FOR OCCUPATION 1 OCTOBER. HOUSE IS SITUATED IN DEVELOPING RESIDENTIAL AREA (MANSOUR). THERE ARE SOME BUILDING WORKS IN PROGRESS NEAR BY, BUT THESE ARE LIKELY TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN SIX MONTHS.

2. IN REEVES' VIEW, HOUSE IS SUITABLE FOR AMBASSADOR, BUT POSSIBLE DRAWBACK IS FACT THAT IT SHARES HIGH PARTY WALLS WITH (A) RESIDENCE OF MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR WHICH OVERLOOKS GARDEN, AND (B) A CHINESE EMBASSY MESS. PRESENCE OF LATTER IS CLEAR SECURITY THREAT, ALBEIT THAT LIVING AREAS ARE SOME FEET FROM PARTY WALL AND MAIN ROOMS FACE TOWARDS MOROCCAN HOUSE. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, I BELIEVE THIS THREAT MUST BE ACCEPTED. GIVEN IRAQI SOPHISTICATION IN THIS FIELD, IT IS ONLY marginally GREATER THAN THAT FACING ANY OTHER RESIDENCE WE ARE LIKELY TO FIND.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35

19 AUG 1974

NBR 25/48/1

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 2

12 AUG 1974

KA 3591/4/1

COPY

Ent

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. GRATEFUL FOR



3. GRATEFUL FOR APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE  
TO PERMIT REEVES TO DISCUSS TERMS OF LEASE WITH LANDLORD'S  
REPRESENTATIVE BEFORE HE LEAVES BAGHDAD ON 14  
AUGUST. HE WILL BE AVAILABLE IN CROYDON FOR DISCUSSION  
19 AUGUST.

GIDDENS

FILES

A & SD  
MR SCOTT



K41 (125)  
8/13/8

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 2  
13 AUG 1974  
A 3591/4/1  
NBR 25/548/1

9

F0248/E095/12

LKS NR 441/12

OO ACCOMOFCCO

RR DOE

GRS 55

GYPHER

TOP COPY 113

IMMEDIATE

(A+S)

NO DISTRIBUTION

Amu

ECYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 120900Z AUGUST.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO IMMEDIATE ACCOMOFCCO TEL NO ACCOM 038 OF 12 AUGUST 1974,  
INFO ROUTINE DOE

sent

(129)

REFERENCE OUR TEL NO ACCOM 037 OF 11/8.

1. PARA 1. PLEASE INSERT THE FOLLOWING LINE BETWEEN

.....FOLDING DOORS, AND, EXCELLENT LARGE MASTER BEDROOM/DRESSING  
ROOM .....

'GOOD KITCHEN AND 2 BEDROOMS WITH 2 BATHROOMS GROUND FLOOR,'

2. ERROR REGRETTED.

GIDDENS  
BT

Mr. Macrae

to see.

13/8

8/13/8

NNNN



GRS 50A  
IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 19 AUG 1974 NBR 25/543A
---

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 121445Z

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 196 OF 12 AUG, 1974.

YOUR TELNO ACCOM 37: RESIDENCE

1. WE AGREE RELUCTANTLY, GRATEFUL YOU ENSURE HOUSE IS TAKEN ON  
SHORTEST POSSIBLE LEASE, E.G. SIX MONTHS. IN VIEW OF AMBASSADOR'S  
FAMILY STATUS YOU WILL WISH TO CONSIDER IF AND HOW REQUIRED  
BEDROOM SPACE CAN BE PROVIDED.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

A & SD

COPIES TO

MR BRUTON, D.O.E.

*Handwritten signature and date 1/78*


RESTRICTED



ADMIN IN CONFIDENCE

Mr Reeves, ~~DOE~~  
Mr Saltwell

has seen



has left  
MED (Mr. Graham)

BUILDING IN BAGHDAD

1. It might be useful if I recorded the substance of our conversations during your current visit as they relate to future building in Baghdad.
2. The formal position is that the authorities have said that diplomatic missions must move to a new diplomatic enclave sited near the airport. No date has been given. All Embassies have been offered two sites each on the enclave area; one of 5,000 sq. meters for offices and a second of 3,200 sq. meters for all living accommodation including the Ambassador's residence. Nothing is said about the terms on which the sites would be made available; the assumption is that we would probably have to purchase. The post's main objections to such a move are:-
  - (i) the lack of sufficient space for our needs - the office site is certainly large enough, but 3,200 sq. meters is nowhere near sufficient for a UK-based staff of 25 or so; and
  - (ii) our dislike of being herded together in a ghetto with the rest of the Corps.
3. The existence of the proposal makes it difficult to decide what our policy should be. If the Iraqis are serious, then clearly they will not permit us to build office and residential accommodation elsewhere. Although it is generally believed by the Corps that the authorities will eventually drop the idea, there is at present no firm evidence to support such a contention. We had best therefore put the matter to the test.
4. We agreed, therefore, that our policy should be as follows:-
  - (i) We have no need of the West Bank site and this should be sold, subject to the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements for the Church. As it is very close to the area around the Presidential Palace now being cleared for the Ba'ath Party (Karadat Mariam), we are unlikely to get approval to put the plot on the open market. It is more likely that we shall have to sell it either to the Municipal or Central authorities. Be that as it may, you will wish to consider the asking price in London.

/(ii)

ADMIN IN CONFIDENCE



(ii) We should seek to develop the river front site on which the offices now stand. The complication here is that the Municipal authorities wish to construct a corniche along this site of the river. This will take part of the site, but when and what area is not known. The site is however sufficiently large to permit us to build a residence and new offices well away from the likely route of the corniche. We should therefore seek planning permission to develop the site along those lines. If the authorities approve, all well and good; if not, we must endeavour to persuade them to reconsider on the grounds that the land allocated for accommodation in the enclave is far too small. We would anyway need to out-house the commercial and probably also the consular sections. This would involve us in considerable and, in our view, unnecessary expense, given the fact that we own our own site already.

(iii) If (ii) fails, we shall have no alternative but to accept a move to the enclave. It is likely however to be some time before such a move has to be faced - 10 years was your guess - in which event, money will have to be spent on improving the present Chancery.

5. There remains the question of the house now under consideration as the Ambassador's residence. My own view is that, quite apart from the matter of the enclave, we should not seek to buy this property since to do so would obviously preclude us from finding something sited more suitably should one turn up.

6. The Ambassador (designate) will wish to be consulted. You may have the opportunity to brief him before his departure for Baghdad. I will discuss the matter after his arrival.



14 August 1974

R G Giddens



RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
- 9 SEP 1974  
NBR 25/78/1

Mr Wright

HM AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE BAGHDAD

cc:  
Mr Clark  
Mr Burton o/r

I spoke to Heads of Missions Section this morning and reserved a time (10.30 a.m. on Tuesday, 24 September) on Mr Graham's last day in the Office for him to have a final round up with Mr Wright and the Department.



9 September 1974

P K Williams  
Middle East Department

hi Bourgeois 25/9  
ja

I told you about the  
position on IDET, and British  
Council Recommendation.

PQ 15/9



(129)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 25 SEP 1974 NBR 25/548/1
--

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr Weir

*Mr. Bunker*

*May I see the programme file  
early on 24 Sept., per?*

*Ph 27/9*

MR GRAHAM'S PROGRAMME

1. You asked me if I would arrange an appointment for you to see Mr Graham this week. I understand that you are free at 6.15 pm on Thursday, 19 September and have arranged an appointment for that time.

2. You will see from Mr Graham's programme (copy attached) that, although he is lunching with the IPC, he has been asked to join the COMET meeting on 19 September at whatever time he can manage. As I mentioned to you, COMET have also asked HM Ambassador Abu Dhabi to attend the meeting, in order primarily to speak about commercial opportunities in the UAE.

*Ph Wright*

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

18 September 1974



Mr Wright

Thank you

Ph. 4/17

Mr Graham's Call.

Flag A-C

[given to  
Mr. Green]

LAST PAPER

Flag D

Do the church  
have this yet?

Mr Graham has asked for copies of the 1929/Soviet Treaty, The 1929 (New Intern) Constitution, and the Anglo/Rozi cultural agreement. These are attached.

2. Mr Graham has also asked about the position of the Anglican church in Baghdad should PSA sell the site on which the Church is located. The site is also connected with the IDCTI issue - latest submission attached. I understand the church site, which is leased to the Jerusalem and the East Mission for ID 1 per annum, will be included in the sale of land if and when this comes about. PSA hope the eventual purchaser will know the 99 year lease which the church obtained from us in 1935.

### 3. Visas

Mr Graham has been subjected to many and varying views on the visa problem during his various calls. We should only add that if, in cases which he judges to be important to us, he copies the visa tale to this dept we



(131)  
we shall ensure that the Home Office, via  
MVD, are aware of the situation. "Overwhelming"  
evidence would then have to be refused  
before we would agree to a refusal.

#### 4. Kurds

Mr Graham is aware of the position of the war  
in Kurdistan. I think however we should stress  
that he should beware the dangers of acceding  
to Kurdish requests for eg asylum, students  
to complete education in the UK (Sulaymaniya  
University example). The British are very sensitive  
and we should avoid antagonising them where  
possible.

#### 5. Oil

Flag E Again Mr Graham is well briefed but may  
care to glance again at Sir D. Mottland's letter  
of 7 August. I also attach the latest figures  
Flag F for M.E oil production (this year which he  
may wish to take. I see little prospect of  
a dialogue on oil with the Iraqis in the near  
future but Mr Graham will, on arrival, wish  
to brief himself on the guidelines we have  
recently sent to Mr Parsons.

#### 6. Commercial

Mr Graham is aware of the draft MOU  
/we



Flag G.

have submitted to the Iraqis. I see no advantage in pushing the Iraqis for a reply; on the contrary it may be a useful card in future should they accuse us of being dilatory since the resumption of relations. I attach a copy of the latest ME trade figures which shows a welcome increase in our exports to Iraq.

We did not receive (according to D.O.T.) an official invitation to participate in the Baghdad International Fair which opens on October 1. Some British firms have taken stands however and many others will be represented by their agents. The D.O.T. recognise that the future importance of Iraq as a market may require us to participate officially in next year's fair.

15/9 23/9



Arrangements For New Diplomatic Mission In Baghdad; Release Of Mr. Ellis; Jewish Community In Iraq; Military Training Programme For Iraq. Resumption Of Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq And UK. 8 Apr. 1974. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2329. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107473488/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=33073969&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107473488/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=33073969&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.